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April 1968) Notes 1277 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS-
INTERNATIONAL LAW-Executive Authority 
Concerning the Future Political Status of the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) is a United 
Nations (UN) trusteeship which has been administered by the 
United States since 1947.1 The trusteeship agreement under which 
59. See note 1 supra. 
60. FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962); Falsone v. United 
States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). See also Katsoris, 
supra note 24, at 61-64; Comment, Accountants, Privileged Communications, and 
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 ST. Lours U.L.J. 252 (1965). 
61. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). 
62. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 739, 741-42 (1953). 
63. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
I. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), which is located in the 
southwestern Pacific, encompasses over 3,000,000 square miles of ocean and some 2,000 
islands. The TTPI is part of Micronesia ("the sea of small islands"), which is geo• 
graphical nomenclature for an area in the southwestern Pacific encompassing many 
island groups. It has a population of approximately 100,000 natives of Micronesian 
stoclc. For a broader view of the TTPI than can be presented in this brief discussion, 
see w. PRICE, AMERICA'S PARADISE Losr (1966); R. TRVMBVLL, PARADISE IN Tllusr (1959); 
Kabn, Micronesia (pts. 1-3), THE NEW YoRKl!lt, June 11, 1966, at 42, June 18 at 42, 
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the TTPI is governed provides that the inhabitants of the islands 
must be allowed to choose their future form of government.2 Thus 
the question arises whether the President may formulate a program 
to determine the future political status of the TTPI without obtain-
ing prior congressional authorization.8 This issue was brought into 
June 25 at 56; see also L. THOMPSON, GUAM AND ITS PEOPLE (1947); T. YANAIHARA, 
PACIFIC lsLANDS UNDER JAPANESE MANDATE (1940); D. RICHARD, l &: II UNITED STATES 
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC lsLANDS (1957); P. 
CROWL, THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE \\TAR IN THE PACIFIC: CAM· 
PAIGN IN THE MARIANAS 53-55 (1960); Chovanes, Patents, Trademarks and Copyright in 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 254 (1960); Codding, 
The United States Trusteeship in the Pacific, 29 CURRENT HIST. 358 (1955); Jacobson, 
Our "Colonial" Problem, 39 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 (1960); Kahn, Tl1e Small Islands, SAT. 
REv., Sept. 8, 1966, at 45; Skinner, Self-Government in the South Pacific, 42 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 137 (1963). 
The following primary sources are recommended for more extensive readings: 
TTPI HIGH COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR; UNITED 
NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO THE TTPI, REPORT TO THE TRUSTEESHIP CoUNCIL (triennial; 
the latest visit was in 1967); UNITED STATES ANNUAL REPORT TO THE TRUSTEESHIP 
CouNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS; annual debate in the Trusteeship Council upon 
submission of this report; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL TO THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL; annual debate in the security council following submission of this 
report. The Visiting Mission Report is the most concise and informative of the primary 
sources. See also DEP'T STATE BULL. (Material on the TTPI is found in various issues) 
2. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands [hereinafte1 
Trusteeship Agreement], art. 6, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 
U.N.T.S. 189. Presidential approval was authorized by joint congressional resolution 
on July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 397. See generally S. REP. No. 471, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947): 
H.R. REP. No. 889, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947): H.R. Doc. No. 378, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1947). The Trusteeship Agreement is only one of a series of international agree• 
ments affecting the TTPI. The first was the Treaty of Spain with Germany, June 30, 
1899, 92 STATE PAPERS 113, 32 MARTENS N.R.G. (2d series) 66, whereby the islands were 
ceded by Spain to Germany. On Dec. 17, 1920, Japan was given a "C" mandate over 
the islands by the League [see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATY OF VER-
SAILLES AND AFTER: ANNOTATIONS OF THE TEXT OF THE TREATY 101 (1947)] which was 
recognized by the United States in the Treaty with Japan, Feb. 11, 1922, 42 Stat. 2149, 
T.S. No. 664. Japan renounced all claims over the TTPI in 1951, Treaty with Japan, 
Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45. Also worthy of 
note is the Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343, whereby Spain 
ceded Guam to the United States. Although Guam is geographically part of the TTPI 
(it is the largest island in the Marianas), it is not legally part of the TTPI. Under 
the Treaty of Paris, Guam became an unorganized American possession over which the 
United States holds sovereignty. 
3. Thus far, resolution of the TTPI problem has been left in the lap of Congress. 
E.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1967, at 1, col. 4; id, at 38, col. 108; id. Nov. 5, 1967, 
p. 11, col. I. No harm will be done if Congress takes prompt action, assuming 
arguendo that Congress is constitutionally empowered to do so. But see notes 6 
&: 54 infra. However, the Executive Branch would do well to assert its power if it has 
the constitutional authority to do so. First, Congress has done little in the past to 
carry out the Trusteeship Agreement's obligations. Second, congressional action will 
be slower than executive action. (Most Congressmen probably have not heard of the 
TTPI.) Third, International political implications demand quick action as the follow-
ing discussion illustrates. 
The TTPI Inay become the last trusteeship in the near future. Of the eleven 
original trusteeships, only three remain, the TTPI, Nauru, and New Guinea. Eight 
others have become independent within the past ten years. U.N. REv., March 1964, at 
40. These excerpts from recent United Nations press releases are fair appraisals of the 
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sharp focus when, on August 3, 1966, the Congress of Micronesia4-
the native legislature of the TTPI-adopted a joint resolution which 
states: 
The Congress of Micronesia believes that this generation of Micro-
nesians should have an early opportunity to determine the ultimate 
constitutional and political status of Micronesia; and ... 
BE IT RESOLVED by ... the Congress of Micronesia ... that 
the High Commissioner, and through him the Secretary of the De-
partment of the Interior, be and are· hereby enjoined to use their 
good offices to petition the President of the United States to estab-
lish a commission to ascertain their wishes and views, and to study 
and critically assess the political alternatives open to Micronesia; 
and ... report its findings to the President ... no later than Decem-
ber 31, 1968.1• 
Whether the President has the power to appoint such a commission 
depends upon his authority under the Constitution independently 
attitude various nations take toward the TTPI's continuance: 
In a report issued on I June, the [1967] Visiting Mission ••• has stated that 
the main obstacles to freedom and self-determination are [excessive economic 
dependence upon the United States] •.• and the lack of public understanding of 
the possible alternatives. 
The Mission was confident • • • that the time was not too far distant when 
its people would feel ready to assume responsibility for deciding their own future • 
• • • (T]he Visiting Mission recommended ••• [association of] .•• the Congress 
of Micronesia, with all preliminary steps. It added that the role of the United 
Nations in these matters also should not be forgotten. 
U.N. Press Release WS/296, June 2, 1967, at 12-13. The following is a capsule of the 
ensuing debate upon the Visiting Mission's Report: 
The Chairman of the Mission said • • . [the TTPI] was not far removed from 
self-determination. • • . 
The representative of the United States said ••• their Government recognized 
that the time was approaching for the Territory to determine the form of govern-
ment and life it wanted. • • • 
The representative of China said the Territory had "come of age," and hoped 
that the Territory would soon exercise its right of self-determination •••• 
The representative of the Soviet Union said that, after 20 years of United 
States administration, there had been no political, economic, social or educational 
progress and that the [United States] had deliberately tried to absorb the Territory 
for its own military and economic advantages. 
The representative of Liberia said the [United States] must make sure that the 
Micronesia people are continually aware of their right and goal of self-determina-
tion •••• 
U.N. Press Release WS/298, June 16, 1967, at 10-11. Is independence the only answer? 
See N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 1967, at 5, col. 3. The article notes the apparent outrage 
felt by some of the newly formed nations because Britain granted only free association 
to certain West Indies islands. 
4. The Congress of Micronesia was established by order of the Secretary of the 
Interior, Sec. Int. Order No. 2882, Sept. 28, 1964. 
5. Congress of Micronesia, H.J. Res. No. 47, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Subsequent 
to this resolution, the President wrote Congress asking for a joint resolution to estab-
lish a commission. 57 DEl'T. STATE BULL. 363 (1967). The Senate has passed such a resolu-
tion [S. Res. 106, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.; see Co~.c. REC. 6656 (daily ed. May 29, 1968)] 
but as of the time of this writing the House had not acted. 
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to formulate and implement a plan to achieve self-determination in 
the TTPI.6 
I. THE SOURCE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
Executive authority to achieve a resolution of the future political 
status of the TTPI cannot be based directly on any specific legisla-
6. Any restrictions on the President's power are imposed by the Constitution's 
enumeration of exclusive congressional powers. Fortunately, because most enumerated 
congressional powers are aimed only at matters of domestic concern within the United 
States, there is little possibility of a constitutional conflict between the enumerated 
powers of Congress and the Executive authority in question, which necessarily will be 
directed almost e.xclusively toward the conduct of foreign affairs. Of the constitutional 
restrictions, two readily come to mind. First, any funds earmarked for the Trust 
Territory, including appropriations for any program to resolve its future political 
status, must be appropriated by Congress. Congress is not expressly granted the .Ap-
propriation Power by the Constitution. However, the principle that the legislature 
must control the "purse strings" is so basic to our concept of government that the 
power was early implied and assumed to rest exclusively in Congress. E.g., I '\V. WIL-
LOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 62 (2d ed. 1929). Second, 
the Constitution would require congressional authorization of any portion of the Ex-
ecutive's program which would impinge upon Congress' enumerated powers. For ex-
ample, in the absence of either express or implicit congressional authorization, an 
Executive order purporting to revise duties on TTPI imports to the United States 
would impinge upon the enumerated power of Congress "to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations,'' and would undoubtedly be unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8; United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658-60 (4th Cir. 1953), afj'd, 348 
U.S. 296 (1955); cf. Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Some 
TTPI imports have in the past been given preferential treatment. INT. REv. CoDE of 
1954, § 4513(b)(l), repealed, 76 Stat. 77 (1962). But, in most part, the TTPI is 
treated exactly like a foreign country for customs purposes, 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 814-15 (1963). Article 9 of the Trusteeship Agreement permits the 
United States to bring the TTPI into a bilateral customs union pursuant to ap-
propriate legislation. See M. WHITEMAN, supra, at 812-13. 
The President's powers in the domestic arena are limited by those of Congress: 
When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over 
the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by 
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. 
Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) ijackson, J., 
concurring). The exception to this principle is quite limited: 
Although the foreign and domestic powers of Congress are extremely broad, there 
may exist certain areas in which the President's constitutional power to conclude 
international agreements may be exercised to produce domestic consequences 
beyond the pale of congressional regulation. In these areas, the President could 
enter into such international agreements, as he might desire, unrestricted by any 
power in Congress either to limit him in advance or to overrule subsequently the 
domestic consequences of his action. Similarly, the President and two-thirds of the 
Senate could conclude treaties in this residual area. and Congress would be 
powerless to override their domestic effects. 
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the "domestic effects" doctrine 
must be qualified: it is not categorically true, as has been so often argued, that 
Congress can abrogate the domestic effect of any international agreement; rather, 
Congress can overrule an agreement only when it concerns a subject with respect 
to which Congress could have legislated domestically. In the vast majority of 
cases this limitation on the power of Congress will not be pertinent; the consti-
tutional powers of Congress have been recognized to be increasingly broad in 
recent years. 
Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agree• 
ments, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 380 (1955). The President's broad, perhaps plenary, powers 
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tive mandate. Most congressional enactments, such as appropriation 
bills, relating to the TTPI do not purport to authorize such execu-
in the conduct of international affairs are limited when their consequences fall upon 
areas in which Congress is given paramount authority. But the TTPI is "foreign 
territory" because the United States does not possess sovereignty thereover, Neely 
v, Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1900); see note 20 infra. Consider Congress' authority in light 
of the following language: 
Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force 
in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens (sec American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356); and operations of the nation in such 
territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings, and com-
pacts, and the principles of international law .... 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). But see 
Vermilya-Brown v. Connel, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); Green, Applicability of American Laws 
in Overseas Areas Controlled by the United States, 68 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1955). Assum-
ing Vermilya-Brown to be correctly decided [but see Note, Application of Federal 
Statutes to Non-Continental Areas, 44 ILL. L. REv. 247 (1949)), Congress has authority 
to extend our laws to leased bases on foreign soil by virtue of the Territory and 
Property clause. Congress' authority thereover would seem to be paramount by virtue 
of its origin in the Territory and Property clause. See l Vv. WILLOUGHBY, supra, 
§§ 243-49, 252-60. 
The Vermilya-Brown "sole control" test has not been extended beyond the context 
of leased bases (which are best considered "possessions" only in the sense of "property" 
under governmental proprietory ownership and qualitatively analogous to art. I, § 8, 
military establishments within the United States). Such an extension to all territorial 
entities over which the United States holds "sole control," but not sovereignty, would 
seem improper. For example, it has been the practice under the Constitution for the 
President, not Congress, to have paramount and almost exclusive authority (save for 
appropriations) over territory occupied under the international law of belligerent 
occupation. See C. BERDAHL, "WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1921); WHITE, EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE IN DETERMINING MILlTARY POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1925); I W. WILLOUGHBY, supra, §§ 252-55, 1038-40; Gabriel, American Ex-
perience With Military Government, 37 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 417 (1943); O'Rourke, War 
Powers, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 157 (1939); Tansil, War Powers of the President of the 
United States with Special Reference to the Beginning of Hostilities, 45 POL. SCI. Q. 1 
(1930). But, extension of the "sole control" test to this case would mean congressional 
paramountcy. 
The President was certainly paramount in the Trust Territory, before it became so, 
when the TTPI was first ruled by a military government from 1944 to 1947. Because 
of the Trusteeship Agreement's limitations on our government, the amount of "sole 
control" has actually diminished from that possessed by the military government. Why 
would Congress suddenly gain authority under the Territory and Property Clause to 
legislate for the Trust Territory (the Territory not having been brought into any 
closer association with the United States by virtue of the Trusteeship Agreement than 
by virtue of the laws of belligerent occupation), when Congress did not have such 
authority before the agreement was made? 
The authority to pass legislation affecting the TTPI is undoubtedly based upon 
the Necessary and Proper clause. In a situation which was very nearly on point with 
that of the Trust Territory (that of Cuba, 1899-1902), the Supreme Court in Neely v. 
Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901), held that the congressional power to legislate for Cuba 
was a valid exercise of the "necessary and proper" clause in aid of treaty obligations. 
The Trust Territory case is complicated by the fact that our obligations therein arise 
as a consequence of an executive agreement. However, that distinction should not be 
talismanic on the issue of whether the "necessary and proper" clause serves as a 
source of authority to legislate-the clause is a valid source of authority where there 
are no international agreements in the picture, as in the case of some belligerent 
occupations, 
The ultimate question which the trusteeship presents is the permissible extent of 
congressional legislation under the "necessary and proper" clause. Its answer is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion. 
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tive action.7 The two statutes relating to presidential authority with 
regard to the TTPI have only tangential bearing on this specific 
issue. The first of these-the Joint Resolution of July 18, 1947-
provides: "the President is hereby authorized to approve, on behalf 
of the United States, the trusteeship agreement between the United 
States of America and the Security Council of the United Nations ... 
which was approved by the Security Council ... on April 2, 1947."R 
This resolution ostensibly granted the President only the power to 
approve the trusteeship agreement, and this is borne out by the 
legislative history, which demonstrates that both the President and 
Congress assumed that subsequent legislation would be necessary to 
implement the trusteeship agreement.9 
A subsequent statute, Public Law 451, gives the President broad 
discretionary power over the internal affairs of the TTPI: 
[U]ntil Congress shall further provide for the government of the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, all executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority necessm-y for the civil administration of the Trust 
Territory shall continue to be vested in such person or persons and 
shall be exercised in such manner and through such agency or agen-
cies as the President of the United States may direct or authorize.10 
Until Congress decides otherwise, this enactment gives the President 
a free hand to conduct the islands' civil administration. For example, 
Public Law 451 can fairly be construed to give the President discre-
tion to create all-native executive, legislative, and judicial depart-
ments. Regardless of how important formation of an all-native 
government would be to the ultimate goal of self-determination, it 
would represent only a change in the domestic framework of the 
TTPI government. However, Public Law 451 does not authorize the 
President to change the international political status of the TTPI 
by bringing about self-determination by its inhabitants. 
It may be argued, however, that the Constitution not only 
7. Thus far, most congressional enactments affecting the TTPI have been those 
concerned with appropriations and auditing procedures therefor. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1681-87 
(1964). The only executive agreements authorized by the United Nations Participation 
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 287(d) (1964), are those to effectuate art. 43 of the Charter. 
8. 61 Stat. 397 (1947). 
9. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
Although the President continued to administer the Trust Territory for the next 
seven years, no one questioned the constitutionality of his conduct in so doing. During 
this period, the President ordered decisive changes in the structure of the TTPI 
administration. In 1951, the Department of the Interior was placed in charge of most 
of the islands in the Trust Territory, Exec. Order No. 10,265, 16 Fed. Reg. 6419 
(1951), leaving the Navy in control of the Northern Marianas, Exec. Order No. 10,470, 
18 Fed. Reg. 4231 (1953). The entire TTPI was brought under the Department of the 
Interior's control in 1962, Exec. Order No. 11,021, 27 Fed. Reg. 4409 (1962). 
American military government in the TTPI began in 1944. Thackrey, Military 
Government in the Pacific: Initial Phase, 60 POL. Sex. Q. 90 (1945). There is no ques• 
tion of the Executive's power to conduct a belligerent occupation without Congress' 
authorization. In so doing, the Executive power is broad and almost exclusive. C. Ros-
SITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 120-25 (1951). 
10. Act of June 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 330, 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1964). 
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authorizes but requires the President to achieve a resolution of the 
international political status of the TTPI. The President has a duty 
under the faithful execution clause to "take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed."11 Thus, it is arguable that an international 
executive agreement is the "law of the land" which the President is 
obliged to execute. There is authority for this theory, 12 even though 
such agreements, unlike treaties, do not require legislative approval. 
In any event, although the TTPI trusteeship agreement was an 
executive agreement, it was approved pursuant to a joint congres-
sional resolution, and it therefore seems appropriate to look upon 
it as a "law of the land."13 
The theory that the President may derive powers, and indeed 
duties, directly from international agreements, be they executive 
agreements or treaties, appears to be in accord with practice. 
The American administration of the Ryukyu islands is a case in 
point. A belligerent occupation preceded the treaty which author-
ized American administration of the Ryukyus.14 That treaty grants 
the United States no sovereignty over the islands, and it provides that 
the administration is to be temporary.15 Congress has not authorized 
the Executive either to administer the islands or chart their political 
future.16 The President's authority to administer the Ryukyus arises 
from his duty faithfully to execute the obligations which the United 
States assumed under the Japanese Peace Treaty,17 and he has not 
purported to rely upon any other source of authority.18 It is true that 
the President has concerned himself only with the domestic admin-
istration of the islands and has not attempted to use the faithful 
execution clause of the Constitution to carry out the American 
obligation to return the islands to Japan. However, in regard to the 
power granted to the President by virtue of the obligations in an 
international agreement, any attempt to distinguish between obliga-
11. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
12. See Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude Inter• 
national Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. !145, 367 (1955); McDougal &: Lans, Treaties and 
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of 
National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 248 (1945). 
13. But see Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 
616, 644 (1945). The Restatement of Foreign Relations takes the position that Congres-
sional-Executive agreements, such as the Trusteeship Agreement, are to be treated 
exactly like treaties, except that they do not provide an independent constitutional 
basis for an act of Congress. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 146 (1962) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Under § 120, a Congressional-Executive agreement is con-
stitutional, in the absence of an independent Executive power, only if Congress, in 
enacting the statute authorizing Executive approval of the agreement, acts pursuant 
to an enumerated power. 
14. Treaty with Japan, supra note 2. 
15. See George, The United States in the Ryukyus: The Insular Cases Revived, 34 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 785 (1964). 
16. See id. 
17. See id. at 787 n.11, 799 n.90. 
18. Exec. Order No. 10,713, 22 Fed. Reg. 4007 (1951). 
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tions such as internal administration of a territory and formulation 
of a political program for the same territory-both of which were 
assumed under the same international agreement-seems untenable. 
Another example is the interim executive administration of the 
Canal Zone. Intitally, Congress expressly authorized the Executive 
to administer the Canal Zone. Subsequently, Congress failed to 
renew this grant, but the President continued to govern the Canal 
Zone. Congress reinstated his authority some eight years later.19 The 
authority for the President's interim administration appears to have 
come from his duty to fulfill obligations imposed by the Treaty with 
Panama.20 The only alternative source of authority would be the 
President's independent powers in the field of foreign affairs. But, 
if these powers were utilized in the Canal Zone, they seem equally 
applicable in the TTPI situation. The practical result of applying 
either of these theories would be the same: in either case the limits 
on the President's authority would be set by the terms of the treaty 
or executive agreement. 
It is fair to conclude that the President, even in the absence of 
express congressional authorization, has constitutional authority-
indeed, a constitutional duty-to carry out those obligations assumed 
under the Micronesian trusteeship agreement. Execution of this 
agreement lies within the scope of the authority given the President 
by the faithful execution clause and by his independent constitu-
tional powers in the area of foreign policy. Thus, it is next necessary 
to determine the scope of the president's authority under the trustee-
ship agreement. 
II. THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
The primary obligation imposed upon the United States by both 
the United Nations Charter and the Micronesian trusteeship agree-
ment is "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust [territory], and [its] 
progressive development towards self-government or independence 
•••• "
21 If the commission requested by the Congress of Micronesia 
acts in conformity with the purposes expressed in the islands' 
19. Panama Canal Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 560. See C. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS 
OF THE EXECUTIVE lN THE UNITED STATES 253 (1921); W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE 
AND Hls POWERS 98-103 (1938). 
20. Treaty with Panama, Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431 (1905). 
21. U.N. Charter, art. 76. The language of Trusteeship Agreement, art. 6, is sub-
stantially the same. The United Nations Charter could be viewed as imposing the same 
"faithful execution" clause duties on the President as does the Trusteeship Agreement, 
since the Charter is itself a treaty. 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. No. 993 (1945). Hence, the Pres-
ident could be regarded as being doubly obligated and empowered to see that the 
Trust Territory advances "towards self-government or independence." For purposes of 
this Note, the existence of obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement is sufficient to 
justify the result reached herein, without need of considering the possible effects of the 
Charter upon the problem. 
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legislative resolution and examines the political alternatives avail-
able in the future, the United States will certainly be advancing 
self-determination, as it is obligated to do under the trusteeship 
agreement. As a first step, therefore, the President should establish 
the commission and delegate appropriate authority to it. No congres-
sional action would appear to be required other than granting the 
necessary appropriations.22 Appointment of such a commission is 
probably the easiest case in which to justify executive authority 
under the faithful execution clause. Once this initial step has been 
taken, however, application of the faithful execution clause and 
other sources of authority for independent executive action to meet 
other potential problems concerning the TTPI becomes more diffi-
cult. 
To illustrate some of the more complex issues which may con-
front the President, assume that, after complete study, the commis-
sion reports to the President and makes the following suggestions. 
First, three political alternatives seem to be feasible: independence, 
free association with the United States,23 or annexation to the 
United States. Second, the choice between these alternatives would 
best be made through a plebiscite administered or supervised by the 
United Nations.24 These hypothetical recommendations present at 
least three questions: Does the President have authority to enter 
into supplementary international agreements to arrange the plebi-
scite? Does the President have authority to declare that the trustee-
ship agreement is terminated upon the exercise of self-determination 
by the TTPI's inhibitants? Does the President have authority to 
relinquish American interests in the TTPI if independence is 
22. Congress seems to have granted routinely the appropriations required for ad-
ministration of the TTPI. See note 7 supra. The commission's members would seem 
to fall within the "special Presidential envoy" exception and would not need Senate 
confirmation. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 12, 206-07, and sources cited therein. 
23. Free association would undoubtedly give rise to international obligations which 
would require utilization of Congress' enumerated powers to be accomplished. It would 
not seem feasible to discuss the constitutional problems raised by free association until 
the nature of that association is developed more fully. However, insofar as free as-
sociation would affect regulation of trade between the TTPI and the United States, 
congressional authorization of that phase of the program would certainly be required. 
In short, the free association alternative does raise more constitutional problems than 
either outright independence or annexation. If annexation _seems unfeasible, it would 
appear that independence might be the best solution, followed by free association at 
a later date. The obvious advantage gained is that negotiations toward free association 
could be pursued by the governments of the United States and the then independent 
TTPI. At present, the negotiations toward any alternative must be three-sided, with 
many different viewpoints being shown within the third party, the United Nations. 
24, Self-determination has been expressed in two ways by trusteeships: plebiscite 
and declaration by the territory's government. See I M. 'WHITEMAN, supra note 6, 
897-911. Plebiscite obviates the defense which might have to be made if certain coun-
tries contended that the choice was made by a "puppet government," especially if the 
TTPI chooses annexation to the United States. United Nations supervision would 
prevent credible accusations that the plebiscite was "rigged." 
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chosen, or, in the alternative, to bring the TTPI into closer political 
association with the United States if either of the latter two alterna-
tives is chosen? The following analysis is only intended to provide a 
framework which might serve as a guide to resolution of these and 
other specific questions as they arise. Thus, no attempt has been 
made to imagine all the possible supplementary executive agree-
ments or actions which may be necessary to achieve execution of the 
primary obligation set forth in the trusteeship agreement. 
A. Supplementary International Agreements 
Exclusive authority in the Executive to negotiate and formally 
approve international agreements insures that the purely procedural 
steps in the agreement-making process will not raise legal barriers 
to the executive action in question.25 Furthermore, the faithful exe-
cution clause authorizes the President to enter into supplementary 
international agreements26 without seeking congressional authoriza-
tion: "Incident to the power to see that the laws are faithfully exe-
25. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). The 
international agreement-making process involves at least four steps: (1) policy formu-
lation; (2) conduct of negotiations; (3) validation or authorization pursuant to a 
constitutional source of authority; and (4) formal approval, See McDougal &: Lans, 
supra note 12, at 202. 
26. For those who are not familiar with classification of international agreements, 
the following serves as a simple guide to the nomenclature used to identify the various 
international agreements to be encountered in the following discussion, 
A. Treaties. Procedurally, a treaty is an international agreement authorized by a 
2/3 majority of the Senate and executed by the President. Substantively, a treaty may 
encompass any subject-matter which lies within the constitutional treaty power. As a 
practical matter, this subject matter is virtually unlimited, save as it might conflict 
with express constitutional prohibitions, such as the Bill of Rights, with rights given 
exclusively to the states, or with powers of the federal government lying outside the 
ambit of the Senate or the President, such as the appropriation or judicial powers. 
B. Executive Agreements. Executive agreements fall into four catagories which 
differ in both their procedural and substantive aspects: 
(I) Agreements Based on Congressional Powers. Procedurally, these agreements 
are executed by the President pursuant to authorization by a majority of both 
Houses of Congress. Substantively, their subject matter is limited to the consti-
tutional powers of Congress, an obviously broad substantive expanse. 
(2) Agreements Based on Presidential Powers. Procedurally, these agreements are 
executed by the President Without authorization by either the Senate, Congress, 
or an underlying authorizing treaty or another executive agreement. Substantively, 
they are limited to the constitutional powers of the President, again a broad sub-
stantive expanse. 
(3) Agreements Supplementary to Treaties. Procedurally, these agreements are 
executed by the Ptesident pursuant to an express or implied authorization to do 
so, contained in a prior treaty. An example would be a migratory bird treaty 
authorizing the President to set up a binational commission to determine the 
locations of bird sanctuaries. Substantively, their subject matter cannot exceed the 
scope of the treaty's authorization. Obviously, the maximum scope of this authori-
zation cannot go beyond the substance of the treaty in which it is contained. 
(4) Agreements Supplementary to Executive Agreements. Procedurally and sub-
stantively, these agreements follow the analysis of agreements supplementary to 
treaties, except that an executive agreement, which may be of any of the four 
categories here set forth, provides the underlying authorization instead of a treaty. 
Obviously, there might well be considerable overlap between the permissible subject 
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cuted [the President] has power to enter into agreements with 
foreign countries necessary to their enforcement.''27 
Executive agreements supplementing existing executive agree-
ments should be and apparently are awarded the same weight as 
those supplementing treaties,28 although the former are certainly 
less common. Still, most of these agreements supplementing execu-
tive agreements could be explained as being based upon an inde-
pendent source of executive power; thus, their force as precedent is 
somewhat limited. One example is the Boxer Protocol of 1901.29 In 
1900, the United States entered into an executive agreement with 
six other powers to maintain conditions of commercial equality in 
all areas of China in which the signatories had spheres of influence.30 
In 1901, to effectuate the goals of the agreement of 1900, the same 
powers made a second executive agreement to occupy temporarily 
certain Chinese ports, to modify various other treaties, and to exact a 
large indemnity from China.31 Congress did not authorize American 
participation in either agreement. The agreements in aid of the 
Samoan condominium arrangements of 1879 and 1889 provide 
another set of examples.32 Finally, executive agreements which sup-
plement armistice agreements with former belligerents or with allies 
matter in any of these categories with that permissible under another. For example, 
if the subject matter of a proposed agreement falls within both the President's and 
Congress' constitutional powers, either a "Congressional" executive agreement or a 
"Presidential" executive agreement would be appropriate and constitutional. 
A problem arises when the wrong procedure is used to form an executive agree-
ment whose substance is clearly justified under the Constitution. For example, an 
executive agreement whose subject matter falls within an exclusive congressional 
power, no such power being given the President, but which is executed without 
congressional authorization, would certainly seem to be unconstitutional. However, 
an incorrect procedure would not seem to inevitably lead to an agreement's unconsti-
tutionality. For example, an executive agreement whose subject matter falls within an 
exclusive Presidential power, no such power being given to Congress, but which is 
executed by the President pursuant to congressional "authorization,'' would appear 
to be constitutional since the President would have been empowered to conclude the 
agreement without congressional approval. In the latter case, Congress has merely 
accomplished an unnecessary and possibly misleading act, though looking to the agree-
ment's procedural aspect might well lead one to believe that the agreement stands 
as a precedent for congressional power over the subject matter of that agreement. The 
present Trusteeship Agreement would appear to fall within the latter category. 
27. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 6- S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 711-12 (1953) (statement of Judge Parker). See also 
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); S. CRANDALL, TREATIES 117-19 (2d ed. 1916); RE-
STATEMENT § 122. 
28. See Mathews, supra note 33, at 366; McDougal &: Lans, supra note 33, at 248. 
Not only may executive agreements become the "law of the land" in much the same 
manner as treaties (REsrATEMENT §§ 146-47), but they also give rise to exactly the 
same kind of international obligations as do treaties. See McDougal &: Lans, supra 
note 33, at 195-210. 
29. 2 ·w. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL Acrs, PROTOCOLS .AND 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED ST.ATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS, 1776-1909, 
at 2006 (1910). 
30. 1 W. MALLOY, supra note 29, at 244. 
31. This second agreement is the Boxer Protocol. 
32. See McDougal &: Lans, supra note 12, at 265. 
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are also common. These agreements have generally been entered into 
to implement the conduct of belligerent occupations following an 
armistice. The uniform practice has been for the President to enter 
into both the armistice, which is a form of executive agreement, and 
the subsequent supplementary agreements without congressional 
authorization. 33 
Closely akin to these examples, where the sequence was simply 
executive agreement followed by supplementary executive agree-
ment, is the Security Treaty of 1951 with Japan.84 This treaty 
expressly authorized an administrative agreement, which in turn was 
considered to be the basis for the protocol agreement with Japan 
whereby Japan consented to American military jurisdiction in cer-
tain cases.35 The protocol agreement was executed by the President 
without congressional approval. This example is very similar to the 
TTPI situation if the UN Charter, which is a treaty,36 is considered 
to have authorized, albeit implicitly, the Micronesian trusteeship 
agreement.37 
It is also important to note that the Executive has exclusive 
power to determine whether an agreement is supplementary, that is, 
whether it is in aid of obligations imposed by an underlying interna-
tional agreement. Only the President, because of his exclusive power 
to conduct foreign relations, may determine the extent and character 
of the obligations assumed by the United States under an interna-
tional agreement.38 Of course, the Supreme Court retains exclusive 
authority to interpret such agreements when they are applied as 
domestic law and presented in the context of litigation.89 However, 
this does not circumscribe the executive's interpretive power: if the 
President interprets the TTPI trusteeship agreement as imposing 
certain obligations upon the United States-obligations which may 
be executed by means of a supplementary executive agreement-who 
is to say that such an interpretation is erroneous?40 
33. See Mathews, supra note 12, at 354-55; Gabriel, American Experience With 
Military Government, 37 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 417, 419-30 (1943). 
34. Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 2491. 
35. See McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power, 42 MINN. L. REV. 709, 760 
(1958). 
36. See note 21 supra. 
37. While the Charter does not expressly authorize the TTPI Trusteeship agree-
ment, it does specify that trusteeships may be granted only by virtue of agreements. 
Because the inclusion of the "strategic" trusteeship provision in the Charter (art. 82) 
was an American innovation which was most likely intended to apply to the TTPI 
(which is the only "strategic" trusteeship), one may infer that conclusion of the 
Trusteeship Agreement was within our government's contemplation at the time the 
Charter was approved. See 1 M. ·wmTEMAN, supra note 6, at 733-39. 
38. See REsrATEMENT § 149. 
39. See REsTATEMENT § 150. The Court has given great weight and even conclusive 
effect to Executive interpretation in the context of domestic litigation. See RESTATE· 
MENT § 152 and examples therein cited. 
40. The President might feel restrained in the exercise of his power if Congress 
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B. Termination of the Trusteeship Agreement 
Termination of the trusteeship agreement by the Executive 
raises no difficult constitutional problems. It is well established that 
the paramount-although not the exclusive-authority to terminate 
international agreements resides in the Executive.41 An international 
agreement may be terminated by a presidential declaration of termi-
nation, a presidential declaration of termination followed by either 
Senate or congressional approval, or a Senate or congressional re-
quest for termination followed by a presidential declaration of 
termination.42 On the basis of practice, it is fair to assume that all 
are constitutionally permissible, depending upon the situation pre-
sented. One commentator lists the following situation where the 
termination of treaties can clearly be accomplished by a presidential 
declaration alone: 
Many terminations, of course, leave no room for disagreement 
among the President, Senate, and the Congress. In a case where: 
(1) the treaty expires in accordance with its terms, (2) the object of 
the treaty has been accomplished, or (3) the termination procedure 
is initiated by the other party to the treaty, the transaction [of termi-
nation] seemingly falls within the routine diplomatic business of the 
President and the Department of State.48 
The same principles should also apply to the termination of con-
gressionally authorized executive agreements. While the Micro-
nesian trusteeship agreement does not contain a termination 
provision,44 it certainly has a primary objective-determination of 
the islands' future political status by the inhabitants of the TTPI.45 
had power to act and utilized it to move in an opposite direction. Such is the role of 
"constitutional understandings": 
The constitutional understandings are based on the distinction between the 
possession of a power and discretion in the exercise of that power. The law of the 
constitution decides what organs of the government possess the power to perform 
acts of international significance and to make valid international commitments, 
but the understandings of the constitution decide how the discretion or judgment 
implied from the possession of power ought to be exercised in given circumstances. 
The power given by law to various organs often overlap. Even more often, two or 
more organs must exercise their powers in cooperation in order to achieve a 
desired end. In such circumstances, were it not for understandings, deadlocks 
would be chronic. The law is the mechanism, the understandings the oil that per-
mit it to nm smoothly. 
Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (1922) (emphasis added). 
41. See Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the 
United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. R.Ev. 879 (1958). 
42. \\T. McCLURE, !Nn:RNATION EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 16-30 (1941); McDougal & Lans, supra 
note 12, at 888-89. 
43. Nelson, supra note 41, at 890 (emphasis added); see also REsTATEMENT § 163. 
44. The only provision in the agreement relating to termination indicates merely 
that the United States must approve termination. It does not specify which agency in 
our government has power to do so. Trusteeship Agreement, art. 15: "The terms of 
the ••• agreement shall not be ••• terminated" without consent of the United States. 
45. Id. art. 6; U.N. CHARTER art. 76, § b; Sayre, supra note 20, at 279-81. 
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Once the inhabitants choose one of the various political alternatives, 
the objective of the trusteeship agreement will be completely accom-
plished. Therefore, once a plebiscite is held, executive action to 
terminate the trusteeship agreement without congressional author-
ization should be valid. There is no problem of congressional pre-
emption,46 since the joint resolution authorizing presidential ap-
proval of the trusteeship agreement does not contain any provision 
whereby Congress retained control over the continuance of the agree-
ment. Moreover, since interpretation and definition of the trustee-
ship agreement's objectives are vested exclusively in the President, he 
alone determines when those objectives are accomplished. 
Because the interest of the United States in the TTPI is de-
pendent upon the existence of the trusteeship agreement which set 
forth our present rights and obligations, termination of that agree-
ment will also relinquish American interests arising from it. Thus, in 
the instant case, authority to terminate is also authority to relin-
quish. It might be argued that the United States also has a surviving 
interest in the islands arising from its original belligerent occupa-
tion. However, this does not hinder presidential termination; it is 
quite clear that the President may terminate a belligerent occupa-
tion without seeking congressional approval of his action.47 A more 
complex problem is whether, after relinquishing American interests, 
the President may annex the territory without prior congressional 
approval. 
C. Annexation 
There are more examples of annexation by executive action 
alone than there are of annexation by virtue of the treaty power, 
which the President shares with the Senate.48 
In 1850, without congressional authorization, President Fillmore 
entered into an executive agreement with Great Britain to annex 
Horseshoe Reef.49 Similarly, the acquisition of the Eastern Samoan 
46. 'Whether there could be congressional pre-emption is doubtful. See note 6 
supra. The instances where Congress has retained power over termination have gen-
erally been agreements where Congress possessed enumerated power to make the agree-
ment in the first instance. See Nelson, supra note 61, at 893-95, for examples. 
47. See Gabriel and others cited, supra note 6. 
48. There have been only two annexations by virtue of Congressional-Executive 
agreements, Texas in 1845 and Hawaii in 1898. The congressional enactment authoriz-
ing the Texas annexation can be justified constitutionally because by the terms of the 
agreement, Texas was to be immediately admitted as a state. Only Congress may 
admit new states. U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 5. Though the question of whether 
Congress had constitutional authority to annex Hawaii was hotly debated at that 
time, the contemporary arguments in favor of that authority hardly seem compelling. 
See 1 W. VvlLLOUGHBY, supra note 6, § 239. It is not at all obvious by what authority 
under the Constitution Congress was empowered to authorize American acceptance of 
a Trusteeship. 
49. S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 114 (2d ed. 1916). 
Consider also the "quano island" authorizations, 11 Stat. 119 (1856); McDougal &: Lans, 
supra note 12, at 265. The "quano island" acquisitions were held constitutional in 
Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890). 
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Islands may also be regarded as an executive annexation because the 
actual agreements under which the island chiefs transferred sover-
eignty to the United States were executed solely by the President 
without congressional authorization.50 Another series of acquisitions 
by means of international executive agreements occurred after the 
Spanish-American War. American possession of Puerto Rico was 
initially guaranteed by the Armistice Protocol of 1898, which was 
negotiated and approved by the President and was never submitted 
to Congress for approval.51 In 1899, the Archipelago of Jolo came 
under American sovereignty by virtue of an executive agreement 
which was not authorized by Congress.112 And, in 1915, the Arch-
ipelago of Sulu was brought under American sovereignty in the same 
fashion. 53 Therefore, it seems too late to argue that the President has 
no authority to annex territory, especially outlying islands such as 
the TTPI, by virtue of executive agreements not authorized by Con-
gress.114 
III. CONCLUSION 
Given the trusteeship agreement's requirement that the inhabi-
tants of the TTPI be given a choice of self-government or indepen-
dence, the Executive is empowered and obliged to formulate a 
program-with or without congressional authorization-which will 
give them that choice. The Executive's authority to act alone is a 
consequence of his duty faithfully to execute our obligations under 
the trusteeship agreement and the UN Charter. 
In order to perform his duty under the faithful execution clause, 
the President should first appoint the survey commission requested 
by the Congress of Micronesia. As further stages in the "progressive 
development" of the TTPI "toward self-government or indepen-
50. 1 ·w. "WILLOUGHBY, supra note 6, § 240a; McDougal &: Lans, supra note 12, at 
265: 
••• In 1879, the United States, Great Britain and Germany negotiated an agree-
ment with several native chiefs providing for joint administration of the island of 
Apia. This condominium, which lasted until 1887, was never approved as a treaty 
or ratified by Congressional action. In 1889, another agreement was entered into 
between the three powers and various native chiefs providing for extension of the 
condominium; this time the agreement was referred to and ratified by the Senate 
as a treaty. In 1899, a compact was entered into between the United States, Ger-
many and Great Britain providing for allocation of spheres of influence over the 
Samoas between the three powers; the tripartite agreement was submitted to the 
Senate and ratified as a treaty. However, the actual agreements by which •.• a 
division of governmental responsibilities, unique in our national history, was 
established, were not submitted to Congress for ratification by joint resolution 
until a quarter of a century after their negotiation. [Footnotes omitted and em-
phasis added.) 
51. Id. at 267. 
52, Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Of course, in what appears to be the better view, Congress could immediately 
alienate the territory by legislative act. See I W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 6, § 2!17 
for pros and cons of this congressional power. One could visualize a wonderful game 
of constitutional ping-pong if the President then decided to re-annex the territory. 
Fortunately, such "ultimate" constitutional questions lie outside the range of prob-
ability. 
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dence" are reached, the President apparently possesses authority to
enter into supplementary executive agreements designed to achieve
this primary objective of both the trusteeship agreement and the
UN Charter. Moreover, when the inhabitants of the TTPI finally
exercise their right to self-determination, the Executive has authority
to terminate the trusteeship agreement. Finally, the Executive also
appears to have authority to enter into an agreement to annex the
TTPI to the United States.
The Executive's authority is not unlimited. Obviously, only Con-
gress can appropriate funds to bring about self-determination in the
TTPI. Moreover, the Executive may not take action in any area
which has been pre-empted by Congress by virtue of its constitution-
ally enumerated powers. However, given Congress' apparent dis-
interest,56 the future international political status of the TTPI lies
almost exclusively in the hands of the Executive. The President
should take prompt action to implement a feasible program to give
the inhabitants of the TTPI an opportunity to choose one of the
available political alternatives.
55. See note 3 supra.
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